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Sol Worth and the Study of Visual Communications 
Larry Gross 
The central thread that runs through Sol Worth's research 
and writings is the question of how meaning is communi-
cated through visual images.1 Coming to academic life 
after careers in painting, photography, and filmmaking, 
Worth was imbued with the conviction that visual media 
were forms of communication that, while fundamentally 
different from speech, could and must be seriously 
examined as ways human beings create and share mean-
ings. Focusing on film he began with the question, "What 
does a film communicate, and how does this process 
work?" (1966:322). The answers he began with grew out 
of his practice as a teacher of film. 
Teaching Film as Communication 
In Worth's initial experience in teaching film, as Fulbright 
Professor in Finland (1956-1957), he had utilized a 
method he later described as follows: "The teacher would 
make a film; the students would work along with him, 
learning and doing at the same time. Class discussions 
would be held in which the various aspects of the film 
were developed and demonstrated" (1963:54). The film 
he made during this process of teaching was Teatteri, 
now in the permanent collection of the Museum of Mod-
ern Art. When he came to the Annenberg School of 
Communications at the University of Pennsylvania to set 
up and teach a course in documentary film, however, 
Worth adopted a different approach: the students would 
make a film. This choice was decisive in orienting him 
toward questions and perspectives that influenced all his 
subsequent work. It led Worth to consider problems few 
film scholars had posed or pursued. 
The most immediate consequence of this pedagogical 
decision was a concern over the inexperience of his stu-
dents: 
The young men and women in my class were bright, but they 
had never before made a film. They had never used a camera, 
edited a shot, or written a script. There was not enough time. 
And I was worried. If I made a film, I could control it; if I let thE 
students make their own films, they could fail. The films migh1 
be bad or unfinished, the cameras and equipment might be 
ruined, film might be wasted. [1963:55] 
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This concern proved unfounded. The students suc-
ceeded in making films and the workshop technique 
seemed to engage them in the process Worth deemed 
appropriate to a school of communications: 
The process of changing back and forth from conception as 
paramount, to the actual visual document as paramount, 
seems to me the key learning process in the Documentary 
Film Workshop. It is the way in which the students learn to 
see. It is the process by which they train themselves to find a 
meaningful visual image in relation to a concept which is 
usually literary or philosophical in nature. The purpose of the 
Workshop is not to produce films (this is our pleasure), but 
rather, to provide an environment in which students learn to 
see filmically; to provide an environment where they can learn 
about the techniques and the thinking necessary to com-
municate ideas through the filmed image. [1963:56f] 
It was the final stage in the Workshop, however, that led 
Worth to the next set of questions. When the films were 
completed, they were screened before an audience of 
students, friends, and faculty. "It is in the period after the 
lights go on, when the comments are made, that the stu-
dent begins to know how very complex and difficult the 
art of film communication is" (1963:57). The students 
weren't alone, as Worth himself became increasingly in-
trigued by a pattern he found in the responses of diverse 
audiences to the films made by his students: 
The greatest involvement, identification, and understanding 
seems to come from the young and the untrained. The 
greatest hostility and incomprehension seems to come from 
the adult professional in the communication fields .... Ado-
lescents find these films easier to understand than do adults. 
[1965:12] 
The Bio-Documentary 
In trying to make sense of this unexpected pattern of 
responses Worth first clarified the nature of the films he 
was screening. He realized that the inexperience of the 
student filmmakers (their lack of socialization in tradi-
tional film codes), and his insistence that "the subject 
~atter evolves from the student's own interests and expe-
nences" (1963:56), lead to a particularly subjective kind 
of film. Worth called this kind of film "bio-documentary": 
... a film that can be made by a person who is not a profes-
sional filmmaker; or by someone who has never made a film 
before. It is a film that can be made by anyone with enough 
skill, let's say, to drive a car; by a person of a different culture 
or a different age group, who has been taught in a specific ' 
way to make a film that helps him to communicate to us, the 
world as he sees it, and his concerns as he sees them. 
[1964:3] 
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In posing the concept of a bio-documentary Worth was 
clearly concerned with analogies between subjective 
films and dreams as forms of visual imagery: 
A bio-documentary is a film made by a person to show how he 
feels about himself and his world. It is a subjective way of 
showing what the objective world that a person sees is really 
like . . .. In addition ... it often captures feelings and reveals 
values, attitudes, and concerns that lie beyond the conscious 
control of the maker. [1964:3] 
But it wasn't enough to see the bio-documentary as a 
subjective, individual statement by a novice filmmaker. 
That might explain why adults could not "understand" 
these films, and especially why "hostility seems to be 
found most frequently among filmmakers, film critics, and 
communications professionals . .. (e.g. 'I think you are 
intellectually irresponsible to teach young people to 
make films like this ... I think the whole thing is a hoax 
.. .')" (1965:7). After all, it is hardly a novel observation 
that those most engaged with a set of conventions in art 
are the most outraged at innovations or variations that 
ignore, challenge, or undermine these conventions. 
It still remained to ask why young viewers responded 
with enjoyment and understanding; after all, even if they 
were not professionals, they were used to seeing "con-
ventional" films. Worth decided that there was something 
in the subject matter and the structure of the films that 
was comprehensible to young viewers because it was 
closer to their way of talking and thinking. In particular he 
felt that the films used ambiguities and hints in a fashion 
that adults were no longer comfortable with, but which 
younger viewers found "safer and more c.omfortable fo~. 
certain themes than [they] would an outnght statement 
(1965:18). . 0 • 
Although he himself probably d1d not see the Implica-
tions of his inquiries at this point, Worth was laying some 
of the foundations for an important analytic shift that 
gradually became explicit in his thin~ing. I b~lieve that he 
was already expressing some uneasmess w1th the psy-
chological approach noted above-e.g., bio-documen-
taries as "dream-1 ike" revelations of the unconscious. Al-
though much of Worth's research on film during th.e rest of 
the 1960s is clearly dominated by the psychological 
model of individual expression, he increasingly focused 
his attention (often simultaneously, even contradictorily) 
on film as cultural communication. Even at this point, 
then, Worth was beginning to formulate two rel~te.d sets 
of questions which he pursued for the rest of h1s l1fe. 
First, he was led to tackle the question of how m~aning 
can be communicated in various modes and med1a: are 
visual images in general , and film in particular, b~tter. 
understood in light of an overall theory of commun1cat1on 
as symbolic .behavior; and what would this theory look 
like? 
Second, he understood that his experience with novice 
fi-lmmakers suggested a radical innovation in the way 
the film medium could be used as a research tool. If 
anyone could be taught to make a film that reflected his 
or her own world view, and the values and concerns of his 
or her group, then the direction of the film communication 
process could be reversed. This meant using the medium 
"to see whether the visual world offers a way of communi-
cation that can be used not only for us to communicate to 
them, but so that we might make it easier for them to talk 
to us" (1965:19). 
Although these two sets of questions were pursued in 
tandem, and their interconnections formed the basis of 
much of Worth's intellectual development, it will be nec-
essary for the purpose of exposition to discuss them sep-
arately. 
The Navajo Project 
The first fruits of the bio-documentary approach and the 
realization of the potential it offered for communication by 
"them to talk to us" were not long in coming. In his first 
exposition of the bio-documentary film concept, at the 
1964 Meeting of the Society for Applied Anthropology, 
Worth already saw the possibility of using this method to 
explore the world view of another culture. 
In a documentary film about the Navajo you look for an objec-
tive representation of how they live as seen by an outsider. In 
a Bio-Documentary about the Navajo, the film would be made 
by a Navajo. One would not only look to see how the Navajo 
live, but one would also look to see how a Navajo sees and 
structures his own life and the world around him. [1964:5]2 
In this capsule "proposal" for a research project, Worth 
later realized he was obeying Malinowski's injunction that 
"the final goal, of which an Ethnographer should never 
lose sight ... is, briefly, to grasp the native's point of 
view, his relation to life, to realize his vision of his world" 
(1922:25). In this context, it is interesting to note Worth's 
sensitivity to one of the most important but often ne-
glected problems in anthropological theory and practice: 
the influence of the researcher's own values and biases. 
The proposed use of the bio-documentary approach was, 
to use a term that achieved currency in later years, reflex-
ive: 
Of course no view by one man of another is entirely objective. 
The most objective documentary film, or report, includes the 
view and values of the maker. The standard documentary film 
tries, however, to exclude as much as possible of this per-
sonal value system. The Bio-Documentary, on the other hand, 
encourages and teaches the filmmaker to include and to be 
concerned with his own values .... The Bio-Documentary 
method teaches the maker of the film to search for the mean-
ing he sees in his world and it encourages the viewer to 
continue that search by comparing his values with the values 
expressed by the filmmaker in the film. [1964:5] 
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This interest in what "other people had to say about 
themselves through film, and how one could teach them 
to say it" (Worth and Adair 1972:30) led to the Navajo 
Filmmakers Project conducted in the summer of 1966 by 
Worth in collaboration with John Adair, an anthropologist 
long familiar with the Navajo, and assisted by Richard 
Chalfen, then a graduate student working with Worth. 
The project addressed a series of research objectives 
and issues: 
1 To determine the feasibility of teaching the use of film to 
people with another culture. [Worth and Adair 1970:11] 
2 To find out if it was possible to systematize the process of 
teaching; to observe it with reference to the maker, the film 
itself, and the viewer; and to collect data about it so as to 
assist other ongoing research exploring the inference of 
meaning from film as a communicative "language." [ibid.:12] 
3 [To test the hypothesis that] motion picture film, conceived, 
photographed, and sequentially arranged by a people such 
as the Navajo would reveal something of their cognition and 
values that may be inhibited, not observable, or not analyza-
ble when investigation is totally dependent on verbal 
exchang8-€specially when it must be done in the language 
of the investigator. [ibid.] 
4 [To] create new perspectives on the Whorfian hypothesis, 
work on which has for the most part been limited to linguistic 
investigation of cognitive phenomena. Through cross-cultural 
comparative studies using film as a mode of visual communi-
cation relationships between linguistic, cognitive, cultural 
and visual phenomena might eventually be clarified. [Worth 
and Adair 1972:28] 
5 [To see whether] the images, subjects and themes selected 
and the organizing methods used by the Navajo filmmakers 
would reveal much about their mythic and value systems. [ It 
was] felt that a person's values and closely held beliefs about 
the nature of the world would be reflected in the way he edited 
his previously photographed materials. [ibid.] 
6 To study the process of "guided" technological innovation 
and observe how a new mode of communication would be 
patterned by the culture to which it is introduced. [Worth and 
Adair 1970:12] 
The Navajo project was enormously successful. The 
films made by the Navajo filmmakers were widely 
screened and discussed as "a breakthrough in cross-
cultural communications" (Mead 1977:67). Worth's in-
volvement with anthropology deepened after the comple-
tion of the project and the publication of its results (Worth 
and Adair 1967, 1970, 1972). He became increasingly 
identified with the revitalization of a subfield, the an-
thropology of visual communications, a term he proposed 
as an alternative to the earlier term visual anthropology. 
Worth felt that most anthropologists viewed film and 
photography only as ways to make records about culture 
(usually other cultures) and failed to see that they could 
be studied as phenomena of culture in their own right, 
reflecting the value systems, coding patterns, and cogni-
tive processes of their maker. His experience with bio-
documentary films had clarified this distinction for him 
and he saw it as crucial to the understanding of visual 
communications. Pursuing this distinction leads to three 
issues which Worth was concerned with: 
1 The denial of the possibility of an objective, value-free film 1 
record and the assertion of an inherent cultural bias of a 
filmmaker raises serious questions about the way we all 
view photographic images, and our tendency to accept 
them as evidence about the external world. In particular 
Worth was disturbed by the lack of understanding and 
sophistication on the part of anthropologists regarding 
their own use of visual image technologies. 
2 The use of these technologies to record the lives of others 
for our purposes, and the purveying to others of our own 
cultural products and technologies (again, usually for our 
own profit), raise serious ethical issues about the power 
and the use of media which we ourselves do not 
adequately understand. 
3 There is a need to understand the nature of film as a 
medium of communication-is there a film code and 
what are its properties? 
I will begin with the last of these, which takes us back 
to the question of how meaning is communicated through 
film. 
Film as Communication 
In the process of analyzing the early bio-documentary 
films made by his students, Worth had realized that al-
though they were subject ive they were not wholly 
idiosyncratic. In his discussion of these films he noted 
that "the films all employ similar grammars (in the sense 
of editing devices and filmic continuities) ... grammars 
of argot rather than of conventional speech" (1965:18). As 
I have noted, the decision to view these films as social 
rather than merely individual expressions led to the ques-
tion of whether there were underlying rules for the shap-
ing and sharing of meanings in film. 
Worth began by employing a communications theory 
model , in which film is seen as "a signal received primar-
ily through visual receptors, which we treat as a message 
by inferring meaning from it" (ibid .:323, emphasis in orig-
inal). The implications of this last point were to become 
increasingly central in Worth's work, but he already was 
insisting that "there is no meaning in the film itself ... the 
meaning of a film is a relationship between the implica-
tion of the maker and the inference of the audience" 
(ibid.). But how did this process of implying and inferring 
meanings actually occur? In two of his early papers 
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(1966, 1968) Worth laid out an init ial model, some of 
which was retained and developed in future work, and 
some of which was mod ified or discarded as his thinking 
progressed. 
Because much of the model of film communication 
presented in these papers is repeated in the paper "The 
D_evelopment of a Semiotic of Film" (1969), I will briefly 
d1scuss some aspects of the earlier papers which were 
less prominent in the later effort. In addition, I will focus 
on what I feel are the weaknesses as well as the 
achievements of Worth 's approach as represented by al l 
three of these papers. 
In these initial papers Worth drew heavily upon a psy-
chological framework for understanding film, again mak-
ing an analogy to the dream as an "intrapersonal mode of 
communicat ion through image events in sequence. The 
fi lm is a similar mode of communication but most often 
extended to the interpersonal domain" (1968:3) . He pro-
ceeded to outline :·an intuitive experient ial model " of film 
as a process which beg ins with a "Feel ing Concern ... to 
communicate something," a concern "which many psy-
chologists feel is almost a basic human drive" (1966:327). 
This feeling concern should not be seen as an explicit 
message that one wants to commun icate; it "is most often 
imprecise, amorphous, and internalized. It cannot be sent 
or received as a film in th is internalized, 'fee ling' state" 
(1968:4). 
Here Worth makes a further point which he did not 
pursue at the time, but which can be seen as an early 
indicator of what later became an important part of his 
view of communicative phenomena: 
Obviously, inferences can be made about internal feel ing 
states by observing a subject's gestures, body movements, 
and so forth . ... [However] there is an important d ist inction 
which must be made between the inferences we make from a 
person's own behavior, which can have a great v.ariety of 
reasons explaining and motivating them, and the inferences 
we make from a coded expression in linguistic or paral inguis-
tic form whose purpose is primarily communicat ive. [ibid.] 
If the filmmaker is to communicate this feeling concern, 
then, Worth continued, the "sender must develop a Story 
Organism-an organic unit whose basic function is to 
provide a vehicle that will carry or embody the Feeling 
Concern" (1966:327). In practice, the story organism may 
be a story in the usual sense of the word , even a shooting 
script, but Worth was dealing more with the "organization 
into a system of those beliefs and feelings that a person 
accepts as true and related to his Feeling Concern" 
(ibid. :328). 
The final stage in the encoding process occurs when, 
"after recognizing the feeling concern and finding the 
story organism, ... the communicator [begins] to collect 
the external specific Image Events which, when se-
quenced, will become the visible film communication" 
(1968:4). 
Meaning as Mirror Image 
Worth then proceeds to define the receiving process "as 
a kind of mirror image of the sending process" (1966:328). 
Because I feel that this position contains a fundamental 
error (and one which Worth later recognized) , I will quote 
it in full: 
The viewer first sees the Image Event-the sequence of 
signals that we call a film. Most often he knows nothing of 
what went on before. He doesn't know the film-maker and his 
personality, and he usually doesn't know what the film is 
about, or is meant to communicate. Should our viewer choose 
to treat these signals as a message, he will first infer the Story 
Organism from the sequenced Image Events. He will become 
aware of the belief system of the film-maker from the images 
he sees on the screen. 
From this awareness he will , if the communication "works," be 
able to infer-to invoke in himself-the Feeling Concern. 
As you can see from th is suggested view of the total proc-
ess, the meaning of the film for the viewer is closely related to 
the Feeling Concern of the film-maker. The single Image 
Events of the film are the signals, these specifically se-
quenced Image Events are what we treat as messages, and 
our inference about the Feeling Concern of the maker is what 
we ca ll the meaning of the film. [1966:328] 
This view is explicitly tied by Worth to a psychological 
model of communication in art enunciated by Ernest Kris 
in his Psychoanalytic Explorations in Art (1952). Worth 
quotes Kris's statement that communication "lies not so 
much in the prior intent of the artist as in the consequent 
recreation by the audience of his work of art. What is 
required for communication therefore is similarity be-
tween the audience process and that of the artist." 
The primary problem with this argument is that it does 
not, in fact, represent the experiential realities of film 
communication. 3 Simply put, it is unreasonable to ever 
expect the process of viewing a film to mirror the process 
of making that film. Given Worth's own model of the 
filmmaking process, it should be clear that the maker 
interacts with the film in the process of creation in a way 
which can never be repeated by himself or by anyone 
else. The very acts of filmmaking are different in time, 
space, and pace from any act of viewing . Moreover, the 
model implies a static, unchanging feeling concern 
which leads to a fixed story organism, which in turn is 
represented by a sequence of image events. In reality, of 
course, the process of filmmaking-as Worth's own de-
scriptions show-often involves changes and modifica-
tions in what one wishes to say and how one tries to say it. 
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The filmmaker's experience is one of choosing among 
alternatives, attempting to realize intentions, and assess-
ing achievements as a means of confirming or altering 
those intentions. The viewer confronts only the arranged, 
final set of images, and can only deal with them in terms 
of conventional and specific expectations, and in light of 
assessments of the filmmaker's control and skill in choos-
ing, sequencing, and implying meanings. This is hardly 
the same thing as "[reversing] the process by which the 
encoder made the film" (1969:290). 
But if this position is so patently untenable, why did 
Worth hold to it for several years and repeat it in a series 
of papers? I think there may be several reasons for this. 
First, I believe that Worth was heavily influenced by his 
e~periences in teaching students in his Documentary 
F1lm Workshop. His method of teaching concentrated on 
forcing the students to clearly articulate their intentions 
and their decisions in selecting and arranging images in 
order to convey ideas and feelings. The model of a feel-
ing concern that leads to a story organism which is em-
bodied in a sequence of image events may not capture 
the experience of all filmmakers, but it does characterize 
the method used in Worth's workshop-. 
Second, the influence of the student workshop experi-
ence may have contributed another flaw of the mirror-
image model: the implication that films are typically 
made by individual filmmaker-communicators. This "mis-
take" is all the more odd given Worth's years of experi-
ence as a professional filmmaker. There is no doubt that 
he was aware that film is among the most collective of 
media and that most films could in no way be described 
as the embodiments of any one author's feeling concern. 
Worth was certainly not a naive auteur theorist· rather 1 thi~k we can see here, again, the influence of the psy~ho­
loglcally based, individually oriented communications 
theory Worth was using at that time. 
In his 1969 paper Worth had already begun to retreat 
from his claim of isomorphism between the receiver's and 
the sender's experience of a film. In this paper he gives 
~everal examples of possible viewer interpretations of a 
film (Red Desert by Antonioni) and concludes: 
Most film communication is not. .. that perfect corre-
spondence between the Fee!ing Concern, ~he Story Organism 
1 
and t.he Image Ev~nts t.hey ?1ctate, and the1r reconstruction by . 
the v1ewer. Most. film s1tuat1ons, depending as they must on 
the ~aker and h1~ context (both social and psychological), 
the v1ewer and h1s, and the film itself, are imperfect com-
municative situations. [1969:295] 
Note, however, that perfect communication is still defined 
as the achievement of isomorphic correspondence; con-
tex~ and other factors are still viewed as "imperfections" 
wh1ch muddy the communicative stream. 
Film as the Language of Visual Communication 
Despite their unfortunate devotion to the mirror-image 
model, these early papers were valuable for an under-
standing of film as communication. By using an approach 
that drew upon linguistics, communications theory, and 
psychology, Worth was explicitly differentiating himself 
from the evaluative concerns of film theorists who ap-
proached film primarily as an art form. The title of his 
1966 paper, "Film as a Non-Art," was meant to assert 
provocatively this emphasis on looking "at film as a 
medium of communication, rather than as an art or an art 
form" (1966:322). He was determined that we understand 
t~e. "difference between evaluation and meaning" 
(1bld.:324): 
My concern is not whether film is art or not, but whether the 
process by which we get meaning from film can be under-
stood and clarified .... While all art might be said to com-
municate, all communication is certainly not art. [ibid .] 
Having elaborated a model of the film communication 
proc~s~, he saw as the next step the analysis of the 
med1atmg agent-the film itself. 
The study of the Image Event. .. -its properties, units, ele-
ments and system of organization and structure that enable 
~s t~ infer meaning from a film-should be the subject of our 
1nqu1ry, and of our professional concern. [ibid.] 
lnyursuit of this inquiry Worth followed the analytic paths 
la1d down by linguists in describing and analyzing the 
structure and functionings of lexical communication. He 
adopted, in fact, the heuristic strategy "that film can be 
~tudied as if it were the 'language' of visual communica-
tion, and as if it were possible to determine its elements 
and to understand the logic of its structure" (ibid.:331). 
Worth called this visual analogue to linguistics vidistics, 
and proceeded to elaborate a model of filmic elements 
and principles based on those of structural linguistics. 
Vi?ist!cs in this early stage is concerned, first, with the deter-
mmatlon and description of those visual elements relevant to 
the process of communication. Second, it is concerned with 
t~e de.termination of the rules, laws and logic of visual rela-
tionship that h~lp a vi~wer to infer meaning from an Image 
Ev~n~, and the mteract1on of Image Events in sequence. Film 
as 1f 1t were language, ~~studied vidistically, is thus thought 
of as t~e study of spec1f1ed elements, elements in sequence, 
operat1ons on these elements, and cognitive representations 
of them that act as a mediating agent in a communication 
P.rocess between human beings-between a filmmaker and a 
v1ewer-between a creator and are-creator. [ibid.] 
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Worth presented his solution to the first of these 
questions-the identification of the basic filmic unit, or 
visual element-through an account of the development 
of the film medium and of the theories that accompanied 
its growth. This account, given first in his 1968 paper, 
"Cognitive Aspects of Sequence in Visual Communica-
tion ," was elaborated in the 1969 paper "The Develop-
ment of a Semiotic of Film." After presenting various 
theorists' positions, Worth casts his vote with Eisen-
stein, who isolated the "shot" as the basic element-"the 
smallest unit of film that a filmmaker uses" (1969:297). 
This seemed "the most reasonable" choice, "not only be-
cause it is the way most filmmakers construct films, but 
because it is also possible to describe it fairly precisely 
and to manipulate it in a great variety of controlled ways" 
(1969~ 299). 
Moreover, the Navajo filmmakers "who were taught only 
the technology of filmmaking without any rules for com-
bining units seemed 'intuitively' to discover the shot as 
the basic sign for the construction of their films" (ibid.). 
However, as Worth himself noted in his historical ac-
count, the first filmmakers saw the "dramatic scene" as 
the basic film unit. This was essentially a theatrical con-
cept: "the first filmmakers pointed the camera at some 
unit of action and recorded it in its entirety" (1968:9). It 
look several years before Porter, in 1902, "discovered" 
that "isolated bits of behavior could be photographed 
and glued together to make a scene" (ibid.:10). In retro-
spect, we might wonder how naive the Navajo actually 
were (most had seen at least some commercial films), or 
whether Worth had been able to limit his instruction, as 
intended, to "the technology of filmmaking without any 
rules for combining units." 
Worth used the term videme for Eisenstein's basic unit 
of film communication, previously called an Image Event, 
"that is accepted by viewers as something that repre-
sents the world" (1968:13). However, Worth then argued 
that a finer distinction was required "if we are to attempt 
further scientific analysis .... The shot is actually a 
generic term for two kinds of shots: the 'camera shot' and 
the 'editing shot' " (1969:299). The camera shot, which 
Worth called the cademe, is "that unit of film which re-
sults from the continuous action of the movie camera ... 
from the moment we press the start button to when we 
release it" (ibid .). The editing shot, called the edeme, is 
"formed from the cademe by actually cutting the cademe 
apart and removing those segments one does not wish to 
use" (1968:14). The process of filmmaking, then, involves 
the shooting of cademes and their transformation (in 
whole or part) into edemes. It is then possible to se-
quence these resultant edemes in ways that are deter-
mined by the individual filmmaker, his communication 
needs, his particular culture, and his knowledge of the 
"language." 
The edeme thus becomes the hypothesized basic 
element and building block of the language, upon which 
all language operations are performed, and a basic 
image event from which all meaning is inferred (1968:14). 
Much of the balance of the 1968 paper was devoted to a 
discussion of parameters along which this basic element 
can vary. This discussion has much in common with the 
work of other writers on film (e.g., Spottiswoode 1935) 
who used the "film language" concept. However, Worth 
felt that "none of these authors developed a theory of 
grammar embodying 'linguistic' elements or rule-like or-
ganization capable of syntactic structures" (1968:12). 
In Worth's linguistic analogy, the parameters of motion, 
space, and internal time are thought of as semantic ele-
ments. Sequence, however, including the manipulation of 
apparent time, belongs to a discussion of the syntactic 
aspects of the film "language" because it deals with more 
than one edeme at a time. "Sequencing edemes can be 
thought of as applying syntactic operations to edemes. 
This does not in itself imply a code, a set of rules, or a 
grammar-but it does make it possible to test visual 
communication phenomena along these lines" (1968:17f). 
Sequence becomes the fulcrum upon which Worth sup-
ported his analysis of filmic communication: 
Sequence is a strategy employed by man to give meaning to 
the relationship of sets of information, and is different from 
series and pattern. As I will use the word here, sequence is a 
deliberately employed series used for the purpose of giving 
meaning rather than order to more than one image event and 
having the property of conveying meaning through these-
quence itself as well as through the elements in these-
quence . . .. Man imposes a sequence upon a set of images 
to imply meaning. [1968:18]4 
However, at this stage, Worth was still preoccupied 
with the quest for a universal vidistic syntax analogous to 
those identified by linguists and psycholinguists in the 
analysis of lexical communication. Following Chomsky 
(1957), he saw the goal of vidistics as the development of 
a grammar of film syntax, "whose rules we can describe 
in such a way that we can distinguish between what is a 
grammatical sequence and what is an. ungrammatical 
sequence" (1966:334). Unfortunately for this enterprise, 
Worth admitted that he found "it almost impossible at this 
point to construct a sequence of shots that an audience 
will say is ungrammatical" (ibid.). Not willing to discard 
the concept of grammaticality in film, Worth hoped to 
utilize the notion of a semantic space having dimensions 
of meaning such as that developed by Charles Osgood, 
to arrive at "a grammar of probability, a system of possi-
ble, of more or less meaningful, sequences based on a 
concept of dimensions of syntax" (ibid.). · 
This prospect was explored in a series of studies Worth 
conducted along with Shel Feldman, a psychologist then 
at the Annenberg School. Some of this work was 
sketched in his 1968 paper, and further publications were 
promised, but events led him to other approaches and 
this line of investigation was dropped. 
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The Semiotic Model 
Two factors played a role in shifting Worth away from the 
attempt to formulate a psychological and linguistic 
model of film communication. First, the Navajo project, 
which might have served to intensify his search for a 
universal "psycho-logic" of visual syntax "determined by 
cognitive processes that all human beings share" 
(1966:339), demonstrated instead that members of a cul-
ture developed film "syntax rules" which could be related 
to their lexical syntax and to their patterns of story-telling 
and their systems of value and belief. 
Second, as he read more widely in linguistics and, 
increasingly, in the literature of semiotics-de Saussure, 
Pierce, and Morris-Worth found his central concern 
shifting to the role of social and cultural influences and 
away from the cognitive and psycholinguistic models he 
had earlier employed. 5 Rather than a grammar of film as 
the language of visual communication, he now looked to 
the broader scope of semiotics for an understanding of 
the rules by which we make inferences from sequences of 
signs. 
... the development of a semiotic of film depends not on 
answering linguistic questions of grammar, but on a determi-
nation of the capabilities of human beings to make inferences 
from the edemes presented in certain specified ways. 
[1969:317] 
This shift permitted Worth to place the linguistic model 
in a perspective which had previously eluded not only 
him but many other film scholars. As he noted, "most 
theoreticians from Eisenstein to Bazin have at one time or 
another used phrases such as 'the language of film', 'film 
grammar', and 'the syntax of film' " (1969:302). More in-
sidiously, these metaphoric uses often served more as a 
hindrance than an aid to the understanding of film com-
munication. Film was all too often stretched on a Procrus-
tean bed of linguistic models and its contours destroyed 
in the attempt to fit it to an uncongenial frame. Worth 
came to the realization that tremendous care must be 
taken if one is to use "that most scientific of sign disci-
plines" for the study of film. He returned to his initial 
conception of the linguistic approach as a heuristic strat-
egy with a far more modest estimate of its utility. The 
strategy had, however, led him to a better understanding 
of how film might be scientifically analyzed. 
I am suggesting, then, that linguistics offers us some fruitful 
jumping-off places for the development of a semiotic of film, 
but not a ready-made body of applicable theory leading to 
viable research in film. If we accept Chomsky's definition of 
language we must be forced to conclude that film is not a 
language, does not have native speakers, and does not have 
units to which the same taxonomy of common significance 
can be applied as it can to verbal language. At this point our 
aim should not be to change the definition of language so as 
to include the possible rules of film, although this may well be 
a result of further research in film, but rather to develop a 
methodology and a body of theory that will enable us to say 
with some certainty just how it is, and with what rules, that we 
make implications using film signs with some hope of similar 
inferences. [1969:318f] 
In most of his work after 1969 Worth followed this pre-
scription, but his focus shifted from film in particular to 
the larger class of visual images in general and, although 
the-two sides of the communications process were al-
ways taken into account, increasingly his primary objec-
tive was to understand better how meaning is interpreted 
by viewers rather than how it is articulated by the im-
agemaker. Before discussing these investigations, how-
ever, I want to turn to some important papers in which 
Worth applied the lessons of his theoretical research to 
the practice of those engaged in the use of visual media 
in anthropology and education. 
The Politics of Anthropology 
The most immediate application of Worth 's emerging 
semiotic approach to film communication was in the field 
of anthropology. I have already mentioned his involve-
ment with the sub-discipline of visual anthropology. With 
the completion of the Navajo project Worth found himself 
near the center of a growing "invisible college" of an-
thropologists interested in going beyond the limited uses 
of visual media characteristic of most work in the field. 
Visual anthropology, despite the important early contribu-
tions of Bateson and Mead, had come, for the most part, 
to mean the taking of photographic or film records in the 
field , and the use of these materials as illustrations to 
accompany verbal accounts or as "evidence" uncritically 
accepted as objective records of objects and events. 
In a paper presented to the American Anthropological 
Association in 1968, entitled "Why Anthropology Needs 
the Filmmaker," Worth took strong exception to these as-
sumptions and to the biases and limitations they entailed. 
In the first place, he maintained that we could not simply 
accept photographic or film images as "evidence" be-
cause they always reflect human decisions (conscious 
and unconscious) and technological constraints. 
Further, he argued that by defining film exclusively-
and naively-as a record about culture, anthropologists 
tended to ignore the study of film as a record of culture, 
".reflecting the value systems, coding patterns and cogni-
tive processes of the maker" (1972a). Here, in addition to 
the obvious echoes of the Navajo project, Worth is ex-
plicitly drawing upon Hymes's concept of the "ethnog-
raphy of communication" in which one is interested in 
what things are said (or not said), why, to whom, and in 
what form. 
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As a corollary of this position, Worth was led to the 
view that any film can be used for ethnographic 
analyses-of the culture of the film's subjects or of the 
filmmaker, or both; consequently, 
[t]here can therefore be no way of describing a class of films 
as "ethnographic" by describing a film in and of itself. One 
can only describe this class of films by describing how they 
are used, and assigning the term "ethnograph ic" to one c lass 
of descriptions. [1972a] 
Worth's argument was controversial , for it implicitly de-
nied the inherent ethnographic validity of much "an-
thropological film"-it was not ethnographic just because 
an anthropologist made it. In fact, he went much further 
and attacked the "visual anthropologists" for their lack of 
sophistication in the use of film, a condition which he 
attributed in part to their naive view of film as "objective 
record": 
The only group or professionals involved in the making and 
use of anthropological films who have no training AT ALL in 
the making, analysis, or use of film are anthropologists. One 
can count on the anthropologists who are trained to study 
films, not as a record of some datum of culture, but as a 
datum of culture in its own right. [1972a:359] 
By the late 1960s Worth was actively engaged in efforts to 
change this state of affairs. He was involved with the 
American Anthropological Association 's (AAA) Program 
in Ethnographic Film (PIEF) and in 1970, in collaboration 
with Margaret Mead and others, he helped found the An-
thropological Film Research Institute at the Smithsonian 
Institution. In the summer of 1972 he organized and 
taught, along with Jay Ruby, Carroll Williams, and Karl 
Heider, a summer institute in visual anthropology funded 
by the National Science Foundation. That fall , at the an-
nual meeting of the AAA, Worth was instrumental in the 
transformation of PIEF into the Society for the Anthropol-
ogy of Visual Communication. He served a term as presi-
dent of the society and was the founding editor of its 
journal , Studies in the Anthropology of Visual Communi-
cation. 6 The society and the journal provided a continu-
ing form and context for Worth and others to advocate 
and demonstrate the rich potential of the approach they 
represented. 
The Ethics of Anthropology 
The issues Worth was raising in the late 1960s and early 
1970s did not exist in a vacuum; in a real sense they were 
in the air. Anthropologists along with the rest of academia 
were facing political and social realities which cast into 
question many of the untested assumptions of their disci-
plir.e. !n 1972 a volume of essays appeared under the title 
Reinventing Anthropology, edited- by Dell Hymes, in 
which sixteen authors discussed the field as a product of 
"a certain period in the discovery, then domination, of the 
rest of the world by European and North American 
societies" (Hymes et al. 1972:5). The essays in the book 
addressed many assumptions, biases, and limitations of 
anthropological theory and practice, exposing flaws and 
ethical problems and questioning whether it was possi-
ble to "reinvent" a more responsible and self-conscious 
discipline. 
Worth contributed a chapter to this book in which he 
explicated many of his concerns about the way an-
thropologists have used and misused, understood and 
misunderstood the visual media in studying and report-
ing about various groups around the world. He identified 
a series of intellectual and ethical problems that have 
resulted from the development and diffusion of visual 
communication technologies. 
For the field of anthropology Worth argued that "an 
ethnography of communication developed on the basis 
of verbal language alone cannot cope with man in an age 
of visual communication" (1972b:349). He maintained, as 
I have already noted, that the naive belief in film as objec-
tive record must give way to a more sophisticated under-
standing and use of visual media as research tools and of 
visual images as research data. 
Worth also criticized the inertia of academic disci-
plines which leads us to "continue examining and think-
ing about only inherited problems, rather than those 
problems and modes our children, our students, and 
even ourselves pay most attention to" (ibid.:350). We 
cannot ignore the growing centrality of the visual media 
in all cultures, not only in Western industrial society. He 
spelled out in this paper some of the ways in which social 
scientists can become more sensitive students of con-
temporary, "visual culture." 
The ethical problems he articulated are more difficult 
to resolve. When Worth first began to develop the bio-
documentary method, he saw it as a way to learn "how 
others see their world," to "make it easier for them to talk 
to us" (1965:19). The Navajo project was an expression of 
his belief in the potential of film to reverse the one-way 
flow of most anthropological communication. But, in this 
paper, he reveals a considerably less sanguine view of 
the role of visual media in the lives of "others" in the 
modern world. 
The Navajo project had as one of its aims the study of 
the "guided" introduction of a communications technol-
ogy into a new cultural context. In the 1972 paper Worth is 
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all too aware of the realities of technological diffusion in 
the modern world. For most cultures and societies the 
question is not whether they will encounter and come to 
live with these new visual media, but when and how. 
In teaching people to read, we implicitly teach them what to 
read .. . . The use of a mode of communication is not easily 
separable from the specific codes and rules about the con-
tent of that mode. [1972b:351] 
One central problem, therefore, is that our technologies 
may carry with them "our conceptions, our codes, our 
mythic and narrative forms" (ibid. :353) unless we also 
make clear to other cultures that these new media "need 
not be used only in the ways of the ... societies that intro-
duce them" (ibid.). 
Another ethical question raised in this paper focused 
on the importance of control over information as an in-
strument of power. Worth noted that "anthropologists 
are notorious for studying everyone but themselves" 
(ibid. :355). Is it appropriate for us to encourage others to 
reveal themselves when we do not? As visual tech-
nologies spread to groups in our society and to other 
cultures unused to manipulating these media, 
what is our responsibility to help them to understand a world 
in which their every act of living can be televised and viewed 
by a watching world? .. . Should we teach them not only to 
make their own films but to censor ours as well? The problem 
as I see it is: What reasons do we have not to insist that others 
have the right to control how we show them to the world? 
[ibid. :355-358] 
Film in Education 
Although I have concentrated on Worth's extensive in-
volvement with anthropology, some of his earliest 
academic endeavors were in the field of education. His 
interest in this area was revived in 1971 when he was 
invited to contribute to a Yearbook which was to focus on 
communication and education. He agreed to write a 
paper on the use of film in education and he took the 
opportunity to draw together and to clarify several 
strands in his previous and current thinking. 
Worth began by examining three perspectives which 
he saw as exercising major-and pernicious-influence 
on "the educational and film communities but with very 
little research evidence in their support" (1974a:273). 
First, and most intensely, he takes issue with Rudolf Arn-
heim's position, which he characterized as "visual pri-
macy." Worth argued that Arnheim's theory of "visual 
thinking" carries to an unreasonable extreme the "rea-
sonable assertion that visual perception contains or is 
part of what we normally call'thinking"' (ibid.). 
1 believe that this is a fair characterization of Arnheim's 
work, and Worth goes on to pinpoint some of its major 
flaws. Rejecting in Arnheim an extreme version of the 
psychological, perceptual-cognitive "bias" he himself 
had earlier manifested (although he never expressed 
such a strongly "Gestalt" position), Worth concluded that 
Arnheim "underestimates or denies the extent to which 
symbolic systems or conventions mediate our knowledge 
of the world" (ibid.) . 
The particular error Worth located in Arnheim was most 
clearly manifested in his denial of the cruc ial role of cul-
ture in determining what and how we "see": 
True visual education presupposes that the world can present 
its inherent order to the eye and that seeing consists in under-
standing this order. [Arnheim 1966:148] 
In contrast to this position Worth aligned himself with 
most contemporary thinkers in saying that 
what we see and what we think about is determined at the 
least as much by our symbolic systems and convent ions for 
representing that universe as by the universe itself. 
[197 4a:278] 
Worth went on to outline the other two perspectives-
that of certain film theorists (represented by Gene 
Youngblood) and film educators-which he felt were as 
inadequate and misleading in their own areas as Arn-
heim was in his. What these criticisms have in common is 
Worth's dismay at the failure of so many researchers and 
educators properly to understand or utilize film as a 
process of communication. 
In the remaining sections of the paper Worth presented 
his own current view of how film could be understood as 
communication and how knowledge of this process en-
ables us to use film in the very process of education 
itself. He restates an abbreviated version of the feeling 
concern/story organism/image event model (these terms 
are not used), but with several significant modifications. 
In this account the complexity and non-linearity of the 
filmmaking process are now emphasized, moving the 
model away from the somewhat misleading implication 
that the filmmaker moves in strict, irreversible steps from 
feeling to story to image sequence. However, the model 
is still conceived in "single author" terms. This is shown 
explicitly when Worth describes the completion of 
filmmaking: 
At some point he decides to "release" his film. It is now no 
longer a personal act but a public and social one; it is a 
symbolic form available for participation in a communication 
process. [ibid.:285] 
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Worth was also ready to abandon the mirror-image 
model of viewer reception, if somewhat re luctantly: 
When another person sees this film, he must (depending on 
how one talks about such acts) receive it, decode it, or re-
create it. Since meaning or content does not exist within the 
reel of acetate, the viewer must recreate it from the forms, 
codes, and symbol ic events in the film .... For communica-
tion to occur, meaning must be implied by the creator and 
inferred by the viewer or re-creator. [ibid.] 
Note that, while perfect communication is no longer 
defined in terms of the viewer's ability to trace the 
filmmaking process in reverse and reach the author's 
feeling concern, the terminology suggests an ambiva-
lence that probably reflects a genuine state of intellectual 
trans ition. Worth shifts between "receive," "decode," and 
"re-create" to describe the viewer's ro le in the process of 
communication, still echoing the isomorphic implications 
of "recreation" as he had used the term in earlier papers. 
Yet he also makes explicit the role of "conventions 
through which meaning is transmitted between people 
by a process of implication and inference" (ibid.). 
Worth was now coming to focus more and more on the 
process of interpretation-how meaning is created by 
viewers-rather than on the process of articulation by 
imagemakers (as in the bio-documentary and Navajo 
projects). In order to clarify the importance of this shift, I 
have to backtrack to an earlier stage in Worth's work. 
Ignoring Interpretation 
In one of his earliest papers Worth had introduced a dis-
cussion of audience reactions to his students' films with 
the comment, "Perhaps, in an attempt to understand a 
particular act of communication we can approach under-
standing by examining the reaction to the act, rather than 
the act itself" (1965:3). However, in most of his work over 
the next six years Worth focused more on the act of mak-
ing than on that of interpreting meaning from images. In 
the study of bio-documentaries made by various groups 
in our society (reported in Worth and Adair 1972, Chapter 
15), and in the Navajo project, it was the films and the 
activity of the filmmakers, not the viewers, that Worth was 
interested in. 
In his 1966 paper, "Film as a Non-Art," Worth appeared 
willing to forego the investigation of the interpretive side 
of the communicative process: 
This particular area of study-the interaction between per-
sons and groups, and the stimuli they relate to-has been 
undertaken by the social and behavioral scientists. Although 
relevant to our interests, the specific study of the relationships 
between peop!e and events cannot be the professional con-
cern of those interested in visual communicat ion. [1966:330] 
Although I believe he was primarily distancing himself 
from an overly subjective approach which centers on in-
dividual viewers' reactions, Worth is clearly advocating 
the priority of the "study of the Image Event" itself. The 
extent of this "bias" is shown by the perfunctory way in 
which Worth and Adair assessed the reactions of other 
Navajo to the films made by their fellows. The account 
given by Worth and Adair of the films' world premiere on 
the reservation (attended by 60 Navajo) is the shortest 
chapter in their book (1972:128--131), but it is most 
revealing. 
They make clear the fact that the idea of holding the 
screening at all originated with the filmmakers, not the 
researchers. More importantly, the account reveals how 
unprepared they were for this crucial opportunity to in-
vestigate the interpretations and responses of the Navajo 
viewers. Only nine viewers were questioned, and the 
questions failed to explore fully their reactions. 
Two of the Navajo reported that they did not understand 
certain of the films. These were films judged by Worth 
and Adair to be "somewhat outside the framework of 
Navajo cognition" (ibid.) either in form or subject matter. 
The way these viewers expressed their lack of under-
standing was to say that they didn't get the meaning be-
cause the films "were in English." This is a most intriguing 
response, considering that none of the films had any 
sound at all. However, Worth and Adair continue: 
Since these interviews were conducted in Navajo, we didn't 
see the translated tapes until we left the reservation, and have 
not been able to question our informants further along these 
lines. [ibid.:131] 
By the early 1970s, in contrast, Worth was clearly insist-
ing on the need to include the perspectives of both the 
interpreter and the imagemaker within the scope of inves-
tigation. In part, as I have indicated, this insistence was 
influenced by Hymes's advocacy of an "ethnography of 
communication."7 However, in order to fully describe the 
development of Worth's work at this time, I have to dis-
cuss my own involvement with it. 
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Personal Interlude 
I met Sol Worth in the spring of 1968 when I visited the 
Annenberg School for the first time. My decision to join 
the faculty of the school (as opposed to taking a job in the 
field-social psychology-in which I had just received a 
Ph.D.) was motivated in large part by Worth's presence. It 
was immediately clear that we shared a strikingly similar 
set of interests and intellectual inclinations; and it was 
Worth who convinced me that my interests in the study of 
art and culture could be pursued far more readily in a 
communications program, where they were seen as cen-
tral, than in a psychology department where (I already 
knew) they would be seen as peripheral. Certainly, my 
experience with the psychology of art subfield had been 
disappointing: those who seemed to have a feeling for art 
used poor psychology (e.g., Arnheim), while those who 
were psychologically rigorous did not seem to under-
stand art (e.g., Berlyne). The field of communications-at 
least as it was represented at the Annenberg School-
appeared to offer a framework in which the varieties of 
symbolic behavior (especially the kinds we call art) 
could be studied with a sensitivity to the role of psycho-
logical, social, and cultural determinants. 
From the outset Worth and I engaged in discussions 
and arguments which helped both of us clarify and, I 
hope, improve our understanding of communications 
phenomena. In these discussions, I made clear my belief 
that the interpreter's role was at the center of the com-
municative process. Put most simply, I argued that before 
one could become a "sender" one had to become a "re-
ceiver." The competence needed for articulation derived 
in large part from one's prior experience in interpretation. 
Specifically, in the realm of art I maintained that "the 
process of artistic creation itself presupposes and arises 
out of the process of appreciation" (Gross 1973:115). 
This position reflected two basic considerations. The 
first was the simple fact of ontological sequence: we all 
encounter symbolic events first as consumers and only 
later, if at all, as producers. "Only upon the basis of the 
competence to appreciate meaning presented in a sym-
bolic mode can one hope to achieve the realization of 
creative potential in that mode" (Gross 1974:71). 
Second, I was arguing that symbolic behavior occurs 
in a variety of distinct modes, and that meaning can be 
understood or purposively communicated only within 
these modes. "These modes are partially but not totally 
susceptible to translation into other modes. Thus they are 
basically learned only through actions appropriate to the 
particular mode" (ibid.:57). 
Two papers which I wrote in 1971-1972 presented the 
outlines of a theory of symbolic competence and aes-
thetic communication which incorporated this position 
(1973, 197 4 ). These papers and the theory they presented 
owed much to Worth's influence. At the same time my 
views and emerging theoretical formulations helped 
shape his views on a number of isues. The paper Worth 
wrote on film and education reflects our discussions. By 
the fall of 1971 these discussions had led-via an infor-
mal research seminar we conducted-to collaborative 
projects carried out by several of our students, and even-
tually to a joint paper. 
Th is paper, written in 1972-1973 and publ ished in 1974, 
presents the out I ines of a theory of interpretation-the 
assignment of meaning to objects and events. Because I 
feel that the presentation in the paper is often unclear and 
overly terse, and because the model introduced in th is 
paper figures importantly in Worth's subsequent writings, 
I will risk the appearance of immodesty and attempt to 
remedy some of the paper's defic ienc ies by discussing 
its contents in somewhat greater detail than I have de-
voted to the other papers. 
Interpretive Strategies 
The questions we focused on in our discussions and re-
search centered around the pecu liar properties of visual 
images. Although our paper addressed the general issue 
of how people assign meaning to objects and events, in 
retrospect it seems clear that our concerns were mostly 
directed towards the visual mode in general , and film or 
photographic images in particular. The basic question 
we were asking might be phrased as: what can we 
"know" from these images and how can we know it? We 
felt that the first step towards an answer was to draw two 
basic d istinctions in describing interpretive processes. 
The first dist inction we made was between those ob-
jects and events which do and those which do not "evoke 
the use of any strategy to determine their meaning" 
(Worth and Gross 1974:29). Most of the objects and 
events we encounter are interpreted "transparently" in the 
sense that we "know what they mean" without any con-
scious awareness on our part of any interpretive activity. 
We generally respond to their presence (or absence) in a 
way which ind icates (analytical ly) that a process of tacit 
interpretation has occurred: our behavior has been af-
fected by the presence (or absence) of some object/event 
in some fashion . We simply haven't needed to "think 
about it." Such tacit interpretations range from our "un-
thinkingly" extending our hand to open a closed door 
when we leave a room, to our ability to drive a car along a 
familiar route wh ile absorbed in conversation or reverie. 
Worth and I used the term "non-sign events" to identify 
the events that we ignore or code "transparently." The 
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objects and events which do evoke an interpretive proc-
ess we called sign events. However, we continued, these 
are not predetermined or fixed classes: 
It is important to note that the distinction between sign and 
non-sign events must not be taken as a categorical classifica-
tion of persons, objects, and events. Any event, depend ing 
upon its context and the context of the observer, may be 
assigned sign value. By the same token, any event may be 
disregarded and not treated as a sign. [ibid .] 
The purpose of this first distinction, therefore, was not 
to isolate two kinds of objects and events in the world, but 
two ways in which we respond to the presence or ab-
sence of objects and events. Having made this distinc-
tion we turned our attention to the ways in wh ich sign 
events are interpreted. Our second discrimination was 
between those sign events we called natural and those 
we called symbolic. 
Natural events, as we used the term, are those which 
we interpret in terms of our knowledge (or bel ief) about 
the conditions that determine their existence. The mean-
ing of these events for us, in fact, can be said to deri~e 
precise ly from those existential conditions. They are In-
formative about the stable and/or trans ient condit ions of 
the physical , biolog ical , and/or social forces that deter-
mined their occurence (or non-occurrence) and config-
uration. The important point here is that, while we assign 
meanings to such events on the basis of knowledge (or 
belief) about the forces that caused them to exist, we do 
not see them as having been caused (to any important 
degree) in order to convey these meanings to us_. There-
fore, while they inform us about those factors wh1ch we 
assume (or know) to have caused their occurrence, we do 
not sense an authorial intent behind them. 
Natural events may be produced by either human or 
non-human agency. "However, the signness of a natural 
event exists only and solely because, within some con-
text, human beings treat the event as a sign" (i~id.) : To 
give a simple example, if I observe a tree bendmg 1n the 
wind , my knowledge of meteorology may lead me to 
interpret it as a sign of a coming storm. My interpretation 
is based upon my knowledge of the forces that caused 
the event to occur. 
Similarly, I may decide that a person I observe on the 
street is a former member of the armed forces because I 
notice that he has a crew cut, very erect posture, and 
walks with a slight limp. In this case I would be basing my 
interpretation upon stereotypic knowledge of the f_ac_tors 
that would result in this configuration of charactenst1cs. 
Needless to say, I could be mistaken. The point, of 
course, is that I would be treating the signs I attende~ to 
as informative about stable and/or transient charactens-
tics of the persons I observe and/or their interactions with 
the situations in which I observe them. 
In contrast, symbolic events are events we assume to 
have been intended to communicate something to us. 
Further, we assume that these events are articulated by 
their "author" in accord with a shared system of rules of 
implication and inference. That is, they are determined 
not by physical or psychological "laws" but by semiotic 
conventions. To assess a sign event as symbolic, then, is 
to see it as a "message" intended by its "author" to imply 
meaning(s) which can be inferred by those who share the 
appropriate code. 
If I were to observe, for example, that the man I saw on 
the street, in addition to having a crew cut, erect posture, 
and a slight limp, wore a lapel pin which read "V.F.W.," I 
could then draw the inference that he was, in fact, a 
veteran and, moreover, that he was communicating rather 
than merely revealing this fact (I leave aside the obvious 
possibility of deception, both communicative and "exis-
tential"). 
Worth and I called the interpretation of natural events 
"attribution" and the interpretation of symbolic events "in-
ference." The former term was adapted from the area of 
attribution theory within social psychology. Originally de-
veloped by Fritz Heider in the 1940s, and revived in the 
late 1960s by Harold Kelley (1967) and others, attribution 
theory focuses on the process by which individuals inter-
pret events "as being caused by particular parts of the 
environment" (Heider 1958:297). However, our use of the 
term attribution as a label for the interpretation of natural 
events is narrower than that used in social psychology, 
because we limited it to those interpretations which do 
not assume authorial intention. 
On the basis of these distinctions we proposed a defi-
nition of communication which , in effect, is limited to the 
articulation and interpretation of symbolic events: 
Communication shall therefore be defined as a social proc-
ess, within a context, in which signs are produced and trans-
mitted, perceived, and treated as messages from which 
meaning can be inferred. [Worth and Gross 1974:30] 
Although I have presented these distinctions and defi-
nitions in a rather general fashion, we had in mind a 
particular set of events and situations-those not obvi-
ously and easily defined as natural or as symbolic. We 
were interested, that is, in what we termed ambiguous 
meaning situations. 
Most of the time there is little difficulty in deciding 
whether an object or event we notice is natural or sym-
bolic. Most people who might observe the wind bending 
a tree outside their window and decide to take an um-
brella when they go out would not think the wind was 
"telling" them that it might rain. Similarly, if we meet 
someone who speaks English with a distinct accent we 
may attribute foreign origin to the person but we are un-
likely to decide that the accent was intended to com-
municate the speaker's origin (however, if we find out that 
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the speaker left his or her native country many years 
before at an early age, we may wonder about that as-
sessment). 
When we encounter a symbolic event, on the other 
hand, we are likely to see it as intentionally communica-
tive. We usually have little difficulty recognizing these as 
communications addressed to us as individuals or as 
members of a group, provided we know the code. And we 
usually have little difficulty interpreting them, again pro-
viding we know the code. Traffic lights are rarely mis-
taken for Christmas decorations. 
One further clarification needs to be made. We were 
focusing on the perspective of the person who observes 
the sign event and interprets it. A sign event is symbolic 
(i.e., communicative) only if it is taken as having been 
formed (to an important degree) with the intent of telling 
something to the observer. That is, if the observer is 
watching two people converse and knows that they are 
unaware they are being observed, their conversation, 
while it is a communicative event for them, is a natural 
event for the observer. It was not intended to tell the ob-
server anything, and so it can only be seen as informative 
about the speakers' stable and/or transient characteris-
tics as revealed in that situation. Of course, certain as-
pects of the observed event, such as the participants' 
clothing or hairstyles, might be assessed as being "mes-
sages" addressed not just to the other participant but to 
the "public" at large; these aspects might then be as-
sessed as symbolic vis-a-vis our observer. 
Life vs. Art 
With all these concepts in mind, we turn to events we 
encounter not through direct observation but through 
photographs or film. Here we find the situation to be more 
complex and more interesting. The point of the exercise, 
really, was to develop a way of dealing with the interpreta-
tion of those mediated events (although mediation can 
occur through words and paintings, etc., as well, photo-
graphic mediation is the most ambiguous and therefore 
the most interesting case). 
In our paper we make the suggestion (supported by 
empirical studies) that there is a learning process by 
wh1ch we come to know how to interpret mediated sym-
bolic events such as films. At the simplest level we 
merely recognize the existence of persons, objects, and 
events in the film and rnake attributions about them 
based on our stereotypic knowledge of such things in 
real life. With somewhat more sophistication we can see 
relationships between objects and events that are con-
tiguous in time and/or space-they go together. The cru-
cial step, then, is to see this contiguity as the result of an 
intention to tell us something-to see it as a sequence or 
pattern which is ordered 
for the purpose of implying meaning rather than contiguity to 
more than one sign event and having the property of convey-
ing meaning through the order itself as well as through ele-
ments in that order. [ibid.:32] 
The final stage in this hierarchical process is when we 
recognize the structure of a sign event, an awareness of 
the relations between non-contiguous elements and their 
implicative-inferential possibilities: the beginning and 
end of a story, variations on a theme, prosodic 
patterns, etc. 
When we look at a scene recorded on film we need 
to decide whether the event was (among other pos-
sibilities): (1) "captured candidly" as ~t unfolded naturally 
in front of the camera, with the participants seeming not 
to know they were being filmed ; (2) photographed unob-
trusively so that, while the participants knew about it, it 
was done in such a way that they "almost forgot" they 
were being filmed; or (3) scripted, staged, and directed 
by an "author" working with actors. 
If we settle on the first alternative, we are likely to feel 
justified in making attributions about the persons in the 
film (their characteristics, their feelings, their relation-
ships, etc.). If we choose the second alternative we may 
feel somewhat less col}fident in making such attributions, 
as we wi II feel that the behavior we observe was some-
what constrained by their knowledge that they were 
being filmed. That is, their behavior may be less informa-
tive because we know it is also "messageful." 
If we take the third alternative we are unlikely to make 
attributions of the former sort; here we will interpret the 
scene in light of our knowledge of dramatic conventions. 
These conventions may be nearly the same as the attri bu-
tional stereotypes we use in the first two instances (con-
sequently they might lead us to similar interpretations), 
and this is not surprising: naturalistic conventions in 
?rama aim precisely at evoking attributional knowledge 
1n order to convey "lifelikeness" to characters and situa-
tions. However, they need not be the same. We may 
" ~now" that the cowboy in the black hat is the bad guy 
Without also believing that anyone we see in real life 
wearing a black hat is a criminal. 
The point is that, although events encountered in "life" 
and in "art" may look the same, we make different as-
sumptions about the factors that determine their occur-
rence and configuration. Because the conclusions 
reached may be the same, in order to decide whether an 
interpretation is attributional (the observer is assessing 
the event as "life"-a natural event) or inferential (the 
observer is assessing the event as "art"-a symbolic 
event), we need to know the grounds on which it would be 
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justified. If asked how we know something we have con-
?luded about an event we have observed, we might say it 
IS because of what we know about the way such things 
happen (attributional interpretation); or we might say we 
know it because we are assuming the event was made to 
happen that way in order to tell us something (communi-
cational inference). 
We hoped that this model would clarify some issues 
Worth had addressed in earlier papers. Most im-
mediately, it allowed us to say that the tendency to see 
films as objective records of events rather than as a 
filmmaker's statement about events derived from a confu-
sion of interpretive strategies. The naivete Worth had at-
tacked in many anthropologists and others who were film-
ically unsophisticated took the form of assuming filmed 
events could uncritically be interpreted as natural. What 
such viewers failed to understand was that all mediated 
events are to some degree symbolic. There are always 
decisions made by the mediating agent-what to shoot 
(and consequently, what not to shoot) and how; and hav-
ing shot, how to edit the footage (one rarely sees raw 
footage); and finally when, where, and how to exhibit the 
finished film. 
A sophisticated viewer will recognize that the persons, 
objects, and events in a film are there at least in part 
because the filmmaker included them intentionally; that 
the sequence of events in the film has been ordered by 
the filmmaker's intention to say something by putting 
them in that order (which may not be the order in which 
they actually occurred) ; and that the overall structure of 
the film reflects the filmmaker's intention and ability to 
use implicational conventions in order to communicate to 
viewers who are competent to draw the appropriate 
inferences. 
From this perspective it should be clear why Arnheim's 
statement that "the world can present its inherent order to 
the eye and that seeing consists in understanding this 
order" so infuriated Worth. He saw this view as contribut-
ing to the kind of approach to film represented by 
Youngblood's advocacy of a cinema which was "entirely 
personal . .. rests on no identifiable plot and is not prob-
able. The viewer is forced to create along with the film" 
(Youngblood 1970:64). Worth's response to this was 
fierce : 
Tyros in the arts always forget that creation and originality 
cannot even be recognized (or perceived) except within a 
context of convention and rule-like behavior-especially in 
the arts. It is not within the context of an ordered universe that 
art exists, but rather within the context of man's conventions 
for ordering that universe.[1974:282] 
Cracking the Code 
In the period following the initial development of our 
theory of interpretation Worth devoted much of his atten-
tion to the elaboration and extension of this approach to 
understanding how people derive meanings from visual 
images. He was interested in exploring both the prop-
erties which were unique to visual communication and 
those which could be generalized to other symbolic 
modes. One of his first efforts in the latter direction came 
in response to a request that he prepare a commentary 
on a special issue of New Literary History devoted to 
metaphor. 
Worth began his paper with the observation that "every 
author [in the issue] 'assumes' that metaphor is a verbal 
event-a verbal 'thing' of some sort" (1974b:195). He then 
posed the question of whether-and how-the concept 
of metaphor could be applied to events in other modes. 
The answer he gave was that "metaphor is a structure 
composed of elements in any mode ... related in certain 
ways" (ibid.:196). The rest of the paper was largely di-
rected towards an analysis of the metaphoric possibilities 
of visual images and the argument that "visual structures 
can clarify a general and abstract notion of metaphor" 
(ibid. :197). 
Worth described several examples of filmic metaphors 
and said that the problems they raise are those of "syn-
tactic forms for nonverbal matters for which we have very 
little social agreement" (ibid.:199). How do we know what 
such metaphors mean? 
When Eisenstein used a sequence in his film Strike in 
which a close-up of a factory foreman (who has informed 
the cossacks about a coming strike) is followed by a 
close-up of a jackal, audiences interpret this as "akin to 
the verbal notion of 'the informer is a jackal"' (ibid.:198). 
Or, to repeat an earlier example, we "know" that the cow-
boy in the black hat is the bad guy. Worth's point here 
was that the understanding of metaphor depends upon 
our ability to apply the correct interpmtive strategy to 
infer the implied meaning: 
Metaphor is a communicational code depending upon the 
recognition of structure and the assumption of intention on the 
part of the "articulator" ... of the form we are to treat as 
metaphor. [ibid.:200] 
For example, it is our recognition of metaphoric inten-
tion that tells us Eisenstein has sequenced his shots in 
order to imply that foreman= jackal, and that we should 
not read these as merely contiguous events. In this case, 
the brief introduction of the jackal shot as a "break" in the 
plot signals us that it is a metaphoric comment rather 
than a narrative development. "The important point is that 
every culture provides its 'native speakers' in any mode 
with a code for interpretation" (ibid. :202). 
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Worth devoted the second half of the paper to an 
analysis of caricature as visual metaphor. Using Spar-
shott's conception (in the collection he was discussing) 
that metaphor is "talking about something as it is not," 
Worth suggests that 
metaphor might most fruitfully be understood in comparison 
with theories and concepts of caricature rather than with 
theories of representation. [ibid.:204] 
Noting that verbal metaphors are statements which are 
neither literally true nor false, Worth says that a caricature 
is 
a structure that reveals a set of meanings intended to com-
municate a certain set of relationships within some under-
stood or understandable context and bounds .... A carica-
ture is . . . a structure that relates several elements on one 
level (in shorthand-that of "reality") with elements on another 
level (the symbolic). It puts things together both as they are 
and as they are not, and the point of caricature, like that of 
metaphor, is that neither is only a "portrait." [ibid.] 
Metaphor, in Worth's analysis, thus becomes a central 
component of the structural code we learn "for the inten-
tional creation of meaning within specific contexts" 
(ibid. :209). It is a particularly rich syntactical device for 
implying and inferring meanings in each mode of sym-
bolic experience. 
Knowing about metaphor means knowing how to organize the 
universe within our minds, knowing systems of myth, of 
grammar, of behavior, value and art as they are defined by our 
group now, and have been in the past. [ ibid .:208] 
What Pictures Can Say 
The larger questions raised by Worth's analysis of 
metaphor were addressed in his next paper, in which he 
set out "to begin an exploration into how, and what kinds 
of things pictures mean" and also to explore "how the way 
that pictures mean differs from the way such things as 
'words' or 'languages' mean" (1975:85).8 
The title of the paper, "Pictures Can't Say Ain't," signals 
one of its main arguments, namely that among things 
pictures cannot imply are negative statements. But before 
getting to that point, Worth began by discussing the gen-
eral status of pictures as symbolic events. 
Using the model of symbolic vs. natural events first 
presented in our joint paper, Worth argued that a picture 
is never a natural event, but always a "created social 
artifact." He then recounts the notions of attribut ional in-
terpretation as contrasted with communication inference, 
making the point that an appropriate interpretation of any 
picture always assumes that it was structured intention-
ally for the purpose of implying meaning. Worth invokes 
Grice's classic analysis of intention and meaning, quot-
ing Grice's view that not merely must a symbolic event 
have been articulated "with the intention of inducing a 
certain belief but also the utterer must have intended an 
audience to recognize the intention behind the utterance" 
(Grice 1957:382). 
The next point Worth emphasizes is that we must learn 
to interpret pictures by learning the system of conven-
tions-the code-used by their makers to imply mean-
ings. Pictures cannot be taken as merely "corresponding" 
to reality, and therefore we do not merely "recognize" 
what they mean; we infer meanings on the basis of 
learned conventions. 
Worth here is arguing against two groups who have 
denied that pictures carry intentional meaning: certain 
logical positivists and linguists who believe that only "the 
linguistic mode is capable of meaning" (Worth 1975:93), 
and others, including some artists, who feel that pictures 
can mean anything anyone sees in them. "No artistic 
impl ication should .. . become a grab bag for everyone 
to reach into and pull out what he himself has put in" 
(ibid. :97). 
It we take art seriously as communication, we must 
acknowledge the separate roles and respons ibilities of 
the artist and the audience. Each performs a distinct and 
complementary task in the communicative process. The 
audience doesn't make the work, but interprets it: 
. . . the reader ... does not write any part of the poem, any 
more than the viewer paints the picture or makes the film. The 
reader (viewer), if he can participate in a communicat ions 
event, recognizes the work's structure, assumes an intention 
to mean on the part of the creator, and proceeds to his ex-
tremely complex job of making inferences from the implica-
t ions he can recognize. [ibid.] 
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Turning next to the question of what "pictures cannot do 
that words can do," Worth answers that "pictures cannot 
deal with what is not"; they can't say ain't. After disposing 
of several trivial examples of what might be seen as picto-
rial negation, calling these "linguistic uses of visual form 
which become sign events in a special language" (e.g., 
"no smoking" images), he discusses the general concept 
of what pictorial images affirm or deny. 
Although much of "what is pictured is often valued for 
what it negates by leaving out," pictures cannot specify, 
out of all the things that are not shown, which the painter 
means to say are not the case. "All that pictures can show 
is whatis-on the picture surface" (ibid .:98). 
On the other hand, pictures should also not be taken as 
necessarily affirming the existence of what they do show. 
Worth draws a connection between the fact that pictures 
seem to show us things-particularly photographs, which 
we tend to believe are the product of a machine that "tells 
it like it is"-and our tendency to see "false" pictures not 
as negations but as false affirmations. 
Pictures in and of themselves are not propositions that make 
true or false statements; that we can make truth tables about, 
or that we can paraphrase in the same medium. Pictures, it 
must be remembered, are not representations or corre-
spondences, with or of, reality. Rather, they const itute a "real-
ity" of their own. [ibid. :102] 
But, if this is the case, how do we make sense of pic-
tures? What do they tell us and how? Worth gives two 
answers: first, pictures imply-and we infer-an existen-
tial awareness of particular persons, objects, and events 
that are ordered and structured so as to imply meanings 
by the use of specific conventions; second, "what Larry 
Gross [1973] has termed the communication of compe-
tence." Pictures communicate the skill and control with 
which their structures have been manipulated according 
to a variety of rules, conventions, and contexts. 
Pushing the argument further, Worth reiterates the point 
that "matching to the real world is insufficient to explain 
how pictures mean," and goes on to say that 
correspondence, if it makes any sense as a concept, is not 
correspondence to "reality" but rather corresponde~ce to 
conventions, rules, forms and structures for structunng the 
world around us. What we use as a standard for corre-
spondence is our knowledge of how people make pictures-
pictorial structures-how they made them in the past, ho~ 
they make them now, and how they will make them for vanous 
purposes in various contexts. [ibid::104] 
Worth's answer, then, to the question he had posed at the 
beginning of the paper is that pi~tur~s commu.nicate "the 
way picture makers structure the1r d1alogue w1th the 
world." 
Toward an Ethnographic Semiotic 
Worth's theoretical investigations did not draw him away 
from his concern with the development of a discipline 
which studies visual communications in a fashion com-
patible with that theory. In 1976 he delivered a paper at a 
symposium honoring Margaret Mead on her 75th birth-
day (1980). That paper adressed the need for scholars to 
understand properly the uses and the limitations of visual 
communications. 
He distinguished between the use of visual images 
and media as research tools and as research material. In 
the case of the former he used Margaret Mead's work with 
Gregory Bateson as an example of how pictures can be 
used by a researcher to illustrate patterns of culture. The 
point he felt needed to be emphasized once again-it is 
a point we all forget too easily-is that "the photo is not 
the pattern" but something we use as evidence to illus-
trate pattern. 
Taking photographs, or looking or taking notes are tools for 
articulating and stating patterns we, as anthropologists, wish 
to show to others. [ibid .:17] 
And there is an important corollary: the value of the pho-
tograph lies in the analysis. The researcher-photographer 
who understands what patterns he or she wishes to pre-
sent will take photographs which will be capable of show-
ing these patterns to others. Success is not a matter of 
luck but of training, skill, and intention. Bateson's and 
Mead's photographs are valuable because of their 
knowledge of what they were photographing and why 
they were photographing. 
The reason their photographs and films are records is that 
they were taken in ways which allowed them to be analyzed 
so as to illustrate patterns observed by scientists who know 
what they were looking for. [ibid .] 
The second use of photographs and films is as objects 
and events which can be studied in the context of the 
culture within which they were used. Here the pattern is in 
the picture and the context(s) of its making. These im-
ages are analyzed as parts of culture in their own right, 
"just as conversations, novels, plays, and other symbolic 
behavior have been understood to be" (ibid.). 
This latter approach is one Worth was later to call 
ethnographic semiotics, the study of how actual people 
make and interpret a variety of visual images and events. 
These images and events range from the personal and 
private to the collective and public, from painting and 
sculpture through television, movies, and photographs 
(including home movies, snapshots, and photo-albums), 
store windows, and other forms of everyday presentation 
of self through visual means. 
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Here one looks for patterns dealing with, for example, what 
can be photographed and what cannot, what content can be 
displayed, was actually displayed, and how that display was 
organized and structured. Was it arranged according to how 
these people tell stories? To how they speak, or to the very 
language and grammar that they use? [ibid.] 
In the last two years of his life Worth gave considerable 
attention to the formulation of an empirical application of 
his concept of an ethnographic semiotics. He was deter-
mined to demonstrate rather than merely to advocate the 
feasibility and validity of l:lis aproach to the study of visual 
communications. At the time of his death he was prepar-
ing two grant applications. The first was for a fellowship 
that would give him a year in which to write a book, 
Fundamentals of Visual Communication, which would 
present a framework through which the process and 
structure people use to make interpretations of our visual 
universe might be understood. 
The second application was for a grant to support a 
project he proposed to conduct with Jay Ruby. That proj-
ect, to be carried out over a period of three years, was to 
be a study of the visual symbolic environment of a small 
American community in central Pennsylvania. This was 
an enormously ambitious and exciting project, proposing 
to use as the unit of analysis not specific symbolic prod-
ucts but the "context-the community and the community 
members' interaction with visual symbolic events." 
In his paper honoring Margaret Mead Worth noted, "I 
am aware that, even as we try to develop a history in this 
field, we also are in many ways that same history." Sol will 
remain an important part of the history of studying visual 
communications. 
Notes 
In the preparation of this introduction I benefited from comments and 
suggestions by George Custen, Paul Messaris, Jay Ruby, and Tobia L. 
Worth. I also drew upon Richard Chalfen's paper, "The Contributions of 
Sol Worth to the Anthropology of Visual Communication." 
2 The choice of the Navajo in this example was not accidental. Worth 
had already been discussing this idea with John Adair, a longtime 
student of the Navajo, who later collaborated with him on the project. 
3 I should mention here the fact that Worth's later repudiation of the 
mirror-image model was in large part the resu lt of many discussions 
between the two of us during the period 1968-1972. The arguments 
summarized in this paragraph represent the position I maintained in 
opposition to the implication on Worth's part of sender-receiver 
"isomorphism" in the communication process. 
4 I should alert the reader that later, in our joint paper, "Symbolic Strate-
gies" (1974), this terminology was significantly altered. Needing a 
general term for intentionally articulated arrangements of elements, 
Worth and I used "order" for this purpose, using "sequence" to desig-
nate temporal orderings and "pattern" to designate spatial orderings of 
sign elements. In contrast to "order" we used the term "contigu ity" to 
designate the "juxtaposition of units or events over time, space or 
position" (1974:32) where the perceiver does not assume that this ar-
rangement was intended to imply meaning(s). 
5 A major influence on Worth's thinking at this time was the emerging 
field of sociol inguistics. In particular, he was impressed with the work 
of Dell Hymes, who had come to the University of Pennsylvania in 
1965. 
6 As of the Spring 1980 issue (6:1), the name of the journal was changed 
to Studies in Visual Communication. 
7 Richard Chalfen, who had assisted on the Navajo project, was at that 
time conduct ing dissertation research which combined the ap-
proaches of Worth and Hymes. Chalfen used the term "sociovidistics" 
to designate an "ethnography of film communicat ion" (Chalfen 1974, 
1977). 
8 Many of these questions were also addressed in a later paper, "Man Is 
Not a Bird" (1978). 
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